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ANALYSIS
World Cup Russia 2018: Already the Most Expensive Ever?
By Martin Müller and Sven Daniel Wolfe, Zurich
Abstract
At USD $21 billion, the World Cup 2018 in Russia is on course to become the most expensive ever. Cost 
overruns at this early stage suggest, however, that the "nal bill will be much higher: the price tag for the 12 
stadia has already grown from an initial USD $2.8 billion to now USD $6.9 billion, although construction 
on most venues has not even started. !e projected costs place the Russian stadia among the most expen-
sive worldwide. At USD $11,600, the costs per seat are more than double those in Brazil. In a stagnating 
ticket market in Russia’s premier league, the new venues will exacerbate overcapacities. With the economic 
outlook for Russia darkening, the World Cup 2018 is likely to become a deadweight to Russian economic 
development through the misallocation of scarce resources.
Yet Another Expenditure Record
While the heart stopper "nish of World Cup prepara-
tions drew international media attention to Brazil, trou-
bles are quietly brewing in the next host country. !e 
paint is barely dry on Russia’s Winter Olympics facili-
ties, but the nation is already gearing up to host the next 
mega-event. As with Sochi, which cost at least USD $51 
billion, the World Cup 2018 is en route to becoming 
the most expensive ever. A 2013 government act (Post-
anovlenie 518) "xed the minimum budget at USD $21 
billion [RUB 660 billion]—and that’s just for hosting 
the event. As the Chairman of the Organising Commit-
tee, Igor Shuvalov, remarked: “We have trimmed abso-
lutely everything. !ere is nothing extraneous, not a sin-
gle obsolete object. [We have kept in the budget] only 
what is associated with the World Cup.” Yet, even this 
bare bones event comes in at almost double the current 
estimated costs of the World Cup in Brazil.
One just needs to look at stadium construction to 
get an idea of the shape of things to come. Ask people 
on the streets in St. Petersburg about the new stadium 
for hometown football team Zenit and everybody has 
a story to tell. “We’ve been waiting for years and there 
is no progress,” said a frustrated fan when one of the 
authors interviewed him on Krestovsky island, site of the 
future stadium. “It’s an insult to the fans and to the city.” 
A middle aged woman in a Zenit scarf remarked: “Even 
a goat understands that the stadium is just an excuse for 
oligarchs and bureaucrats to steal money.”
Construction on the Zenit stadium began in 2006 
with an estimated budget of USD $200 million and the 
venue was slated to open in 2009. !at turned out to be 
a pipe dream. Originally named the “Gazprom Arena” 
for its primary sponsor, the stadium has since lost both 
the sponsor and the name, leaving the Russian state on 
the hook for "nancing. !e budget has now risen to 
over USD $1 billion, rivalling that of the Wembley Sta-
dium, one of the big "nancial "ascos of stadium con-
struction. !e opening date has been pushed back to 
2016, but seasoned residents intimate that it might well 
take until the 2018 World Cup before it opens its gates.
!e expensive complications with the stadium in 
St. Petersburg seem to foreshadow the fate of the prep-
arations for the 2018 World Cup, to be held in 11 cit-
ies in European Russia from 8 June to 8 July 2018 (see 
the map in Figure 1). As of June 2014, only 3 out of 12 
stadia were even close to completion—Moscow’s new 
Otkrytie Arena as well as the stadia in Kazan and Sochi. 
With Luzhniki and Ekaterinburg’s Central Stadium, a 
further two already exist but are undergoing total ren-
ovation. St. Petersburg’s stalled stadium is years from 
completion, and the remaining six stadia must be built 
from scratch, but work has yet to begin (see Table 2). 
!e problem is that budgets—both for stadium con-
struction and mega-event preparations at large—have 
a way of ballooning out of control, particularly because 
the deadline of the tournament’s opening is not negotia-
ble. It then falls to the public to pay the bills, on top of 
the major construction-related disruptions they endure 
during preparations.
!e Troubles of Sochi and Kazan
!e residents of Sochi and Kazan have already been 
through what awaits the other host cities: With the 2014 
Winter Olympics and the 2013 World University Games 
(the so-called Universiade) both cities have hosted recent 
mega-events. As a result, they already have the majority 
of infrastructure for the upcoming World Cup—includ-
ing a stadium, an airport with expanded capacity, road 
upgrades and an adequate number of hotel rooms. By 
now, however, residents of Sochi are weary of the con-
tinuing mega-event merry-go-round: “I don’t have any 
feelings about the World Cup [in Sochi],” says one res-
ident. “It’s too far away to think about. I’m just glad 
they’re using what they’ve already built. We can’t take 
any more construction”.
But the tribulations of Sochi and Kazan do not bode 
well for the remaining host cities. With 45,000 seats 
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Kazan-Arena is the second largest stadium in Russia 
after Moscow’s Luzhniki and construction was com-
pleted just in time for the Universiade 2013 at an esti-
mated "nal cost of USD $471 million—almost dou-
ble the initial estimate. Sochi’s Fisht stadium, the site 
for the opening and closing ceremonies of the Win-
ter Olympics, has a similar story. !e initial budget in 
2007 was USD $56 million and construction began in 
2009. It later transpired that work had begun illegally, 
without the necessary health and safety inspections or 
environmental impact studies. After numerous delays, 
labour controversies, worker accidents, environmental 
violations and huge cost overruns, the Fisht stadium was 
barely completed before the start of the Winter Olym-
pics at an estimated "nal price of USD $780 million.
Construction Delays and Escalating Costs
!e travails of stadium construction in St. Petersburg, 
Kazan and Sochi might multiply for the World Cup. 
While the Kazan and Sochi projects focused on one 
location, Russia is now facing the challenge of coor-
dinating eight stadium projects across eight cities at 
the same time. !is means dealing with the diverging 
demands of di#erent regional elites, di#erent contrac-
tors, di#erent stakeholders and di#erent urban settings. 
Time pressure further compounds this situation. Vitaliy 
Mutko, the Russian Minister for Sports, admitted in 
March 2014 that construction is already behind sched-
ule in every location: “!e pace of designing the stadi-
ums gives cause for alarm. Deadlines are being broken. 
!ere are problems in every region.” At that point, seven 
stadia were still in the design phase.
As an early sign of trouble, costs are already going 
through the un"nished roof. Between the bid in 2010 
and June 2014, forecasts for stadium expenditures have 
more than doubled from USD $2.8 billion to USD $6.9 
billion (see Table 1). !is makes the 12 stadia more 
expensive than the 20 stadia built for the World Cup 
2002 in Korea and Japan, accounting for in$ation. And 
the USD $6.9 billion will not be the "nal estimate. In 
Brazil, for example, actual costs more than doubled 
when compared to estimates four years out.
!e projected costs place the stadia in Russia among 
the most expensive worldwide. At USD $577 million, 
the average cost per stadium is more than 50% higher 
than in Brazil and more than 3.5 times higher than 
for the World Cup stadia in Germany 2006 (see Mül-
ler 2014). Per seat, average costs are USD $11,600 (see 
Figure 2). Compare this to the average seat in a football 
stadium for the World Cup 2006 in Germany, which 
cost about a quarter of that—just over USD $3,000.
It is hard to blame higher input costs for these price 
excesses. Labour, building material and land are, if any-
thing, less expensive in Russia than in Western Europe. 
Technical requirements, too, are comparable, since FIFA 
stipulates them. A closer look suggests that some of the 
price in$ation might be due to contractors skimming 
o# rents. SportEngineering, a state-owned out"t that 
belongs to the Ministry of Sport, plays a central role in 
the contracting process. It became the developer on sev-
eral of the stadium projects, although it often did not 
submit the lowest bid in the tenders. It does not, how-
ever, conduct much of the work itself, but outsources 
it to subcontractors. In the course of this outsourcing, 
SportEngineering keeps a generous portion of the funds 
for itself—“for responsibility”, as it claims. !is respon-
sibility has not kept the costs from escalating and the 
taxpayers from being exposed to overpriced sports ven-
ues funded from the treasury.
Excess Capacities
When "nished, the Russian World Cup stadia will exac-
erbate another problem: overcapacities. Stadium con-
struction for the event will increase the number of sta-
dium seats in Russia by nearly half a million. !is is 
more than one-third of the capacity that existed in the 
country at the time of the bid in 2010. Yet, most Rus-
sian football stadia are already too large for the crowds 
they draw. !e 15 clubs in the premier league use about 
60% of their stadium capacities. Moreover, going to 
football matches is not a widespread pastime in Rus-
sia, compared to other countries. No more than 0.14% 
of the population go to see a premier league game. !e 
average number of fans per game is just under 12,000. 
!ese attendance "gures place Russia at the bottom of 
the table among larger countries in Europe. !e demand 
for football tickets has not grown since the early 2000s, 
despite increasing disposable income. !ese factors make 
it unlikely that the investment into stadia is going to 
provide economic returns, raising the spectre of white 
elephants. Indeed, private investors or clubs have not 
come forward to fund the stadium construction. !is 
disinterest from the private sector has forced the Rus-
sian state to dig into the federal budget for construction 
costs—just like in Brazil and South Africa.
Some of the outcomes of this building spree are noth-
ing short of Kafkaesque. !e Central Stadium in Ekat-
erinburg was built in 1957 in Stalinist neoclassicist style 
and re-opened after an USD $82 million renovation in 
2011, just after the World Cup had been awarded to 
Russia. It is now slated to close again for upgrading for 
the World Cup. !e projected bill: almost half a billion 
US-Dollars (see Table 1). In the course of the renovation, 
the seating capacity will expand from 27,000 to 44,000, 
which is far higher than forecasts for future attendance. 
Since opposition candidate Evgeniy Roizman became 
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mayor of Ekaterinburg in 2013 and ousted the incum-
bent from United Russia, the debate has become more 
heated. He has fuelled controversies over whether it 
would be cheaper and less detrimental to the protected 
architecture to build a new stadium rather than revamp 
the existing one. Roizman is even skeptical of Ekaterin-
burg hosting the World Cup at all: “I don’t know if it’s 
worth spending 12 to 15 billion [USD $390 to $490 mil-
lion] for four games in Ekaterinburg. I wouldn’t hurry 
to open the city budget to fund an enormous interna-
tional event that the city might not be interested in.”
“If We Pay a Small Fine, We Could Get Out 
Of !is.”
If the preparations for the World Cup 2018 continue 
on their current path, it is clear that the mega-event 
will su#er from pro$igacy and produce massive sta-
dium overcapacities. Every one of the stadium projects 
is already above budget and behind schedule. Yet, even 
compiling this information is di%cult due to the lack 
of transparency: there is no monitoring of costs and no 
uni"ed source of information such as a website for the 
public, neither is the bid book available online to com-
pare promises against realities.
While the ine%cient allocation of resources will be 
welcome for the elites who have a stake in the event, it 
also increases pressure on the state budget. !e eco-
nomic outlook for Russia is bleak following the cri-
sis in Ukraine, with growth forecasts a mere 0.2% for 
2014, capital $ight as high as during the 2008 "nan-
cial crisis and a recent downgrade of the credit rating 
to just above junk bond status. !e Russian state can 
ill-a#ord another extravaganza of the magnitude of the 
Sochi Games.
For Putin, this dilemma should cause headaches. He 
might "nd consolation in knowing that he is not the 
"rst person in the Kremlin to regret having clinched a 
mega-event. “!is event will cost colossal amounts of 
money. In addition to massive expenditure, there is also 
the possibility of all kinds of scandals,” wrote Leonid 
Brezhnev in 1975 about the 1980 Summer Games in a 
letter to Konstantin Chernenko, then the President of 
the Games Organising Committee and later Brezhnev’s 
successor. “Some comrades have suggested to me that if 
we pay a small "ne, we could get out of this.” Who would 
not forgive Putin for having similar second thoughts?
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Table 1: Stadium Investments for 2018 World Cup
City
Popula-
tion
(million)
Stadium Stadium Cost
Name Status Opened Planned 
2010
Current 
2014
Per seat 
USD 
thousand
Overrun
%
USD million
Moscow 11.5 Luzhniki Upgrade 1956 240 654 8.1 172.5
Otkrytie New 2014 290 458 10.4 57.9
St. Petersburg 4.9 Zenit New 2016e 415 1,144 16.5 175.7
Ekaterinburg 1.4 Central Upgrade 1957 160 497 11.2 210.6
N. Novgorod 1.3 Strelka New 2017e 240 556 12.4 131.7
Samara 1.2 tbd New 2017e 180 431 9.6 139.4
Rostov 1.1 Levber-don Arena New 2017e 225 474 10.5 110.6
Kazan 1.1 Kazan-Arena New 2013 250 471 10.4 88.4
Volgograd 1.0 Pobeda New 2017e 210 474 10.5 125.7
Kaliningrad 0.4 Baltic Arena New 2017e 210 490 10.9 133.3
Saransk 0.3 Yubileiny New 2015e 180 490 10.9 172.2
Sochi 0.3 Fisht New 2014 225 780 17.8 246.7
Average 235 577 11.6 147
Total 10 new, 2 upgraded 2,825 6,919
Sources: Population data from 2010 census; FIFA, Vedomosti, Interfax, ITAR-TASS, Don News, gazeta.ru, Rossiya2018.rf, wc-2018.
ru.; an exchange rate of USD 1 = RUB 30.6 was used for calculation; e=expected
Table 2: 2018 World Cup Stadium Status
City Stadium Status as of June 2014
Moscow 
(Luzhniki)
Wholesale refurbishment of historic Lužniki stadium already underway. Facility will 
host the World Cup "nal match. 
Moscow 
(Otkrytie)
New Otkrytie arena scheduled to open July 2014. Slated to host World Cup opening..
St. Petersburg Completion of the Zenit stadium is now 5 years past schedule, costing over USD $1 bil-lion so far. Estimated completion now 2016. 
Ekaterinburg Reconstruction of existing stadium has been delayed due to protected historic status. Work promised to begin no later than September 2014. 
Nizhny Novgorod Land is currently being purchased for the stadium. Construction is slated to be com-pleted by 2016. 
Samara Stadium design has passed necessary government inspections and construction is nearly ready to begin.
Rostov Regional governor has presented "nalized stadium designs. Construction is set to begin as soon as land purchase is complete.
Volgograd Construction of the new stadium will begin as soon as crews complete demolition of the old stadium, scheduled no later than August 2014.
Kaliningrad Supply roads are currently being built to the  stadium construction site. Actual work on the stadium is scheduled to begin in summer 2014. 
Saransk Stadium work began in 2010 but was halted to ensure compliance with FIFA require-ments. Work is scheduled to resume by June 2014. 
Sources: Vedomosti, ITAR-TASS, Interfax, UralInformBuro, Championat-Rostov.ru, Rossiya2018.rf, wc-2018.ru
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Figure 1: Map of Stadia and of Transport Infrastructure for the World Cup 2018 in Russia
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ANALYSIS
!e Legacy of the Sochi Olympics
By Robert Orttung, Washington
Abstract
Russia invaded Ukraine immediately after Sochi’s closing ceremony, quickly shifting world attention from 
the quadrennial winter sports competition to the reality of warfare in the center of Europe. Ironically, this 
transition will probably be the main legacy for a mega-event that had avoided many of the disasters com-
mentators had predicted.
Olympic Dreams
With the Olympics’ concentrated media focus, inten-
sive investment, and high level political attention, audi-
ences see them as more than a sporting competition. 
Observers often have high expectations that the games 
will drive enormous change for the cities and countries 
that host them.
Sometimes, these expectations have been realized. 
In the case of Barcelona, the Olympics spurred a major 
process of urban renewal, creating a great city for resi-
dents and an attractive tourist destination. In Seoul, the 
Olympics played a role in South Korea’s transition from 
military dictatorship to democratic rule.
Expectations that the Olympics would bring polit-
ical change to China, by contrast, largely were unreal-
ized. !e Communist Party continues to clutch power 
as tightly as ever and the smoggy haze that envelopes 
Beijing remains a fact of life. During the Games, China 
did relax some of its media laws under pressure, but these 
concessions were only temporary and did not apply to 
local journalists.
Four months after the closing ceremony in Sochi, it 
is possible to draw some initial conclusions about the 
legacy of those games. Despite the vast media attention 
focused on preparations, security, and human rights 
before the sports competition began, the Sochi Olym-
pics were relatively successful for Russia and the man 
most responsible for organizing them, President Vladi-
mir Putin. Despite the high cost, the facilities were ready 
on time. Although temperatures were relatively warm, 
the competitions proceeded with only a few problems, 
such as mushy snow. No terrorist attacks materialized, 
perhaps thanks to extensive preparations. !e opening 
ceremony, in particular, won plaudits for presenting an 
inclusive model of Russian culture that had not existed 
before, including bringing back artists who earlier had 
been excluded from the Russian canon.
International Consequences
While Putin saw the games mainly as a way to appeal 
to his domestic base of supporters, one of Sochi’s goals 
was to build Russia’s image on the world stage. Putin 
sought to show that Russia could compete with the west-
ern countries who traditionally host the Olympics in 
terms of event management and organizational prowess. 
Setting aside the high cost—at $51 billion in apparent 
spending, the Sochi Olympics were the most expensive 
ever—Russia largely succeeded on these terms.
However, the gains that Russia achieved by the 
successful Olympics quickly evaporated when Russia 
invaded Ukraine, occupied Crimea, and began pro-
viding support for pro-Russian separatists in eastern 
Ukraine, leading to an increasingly violent insurgency. 
Before the Olympics, Russia’s relations with the West 
were deteriorating and many prominent Western lead-
ers refused to attend the opening ceremonies, snubbing 
Putin. !e U.S.–Russia relationship, in particular, had 
been $agging for some time and the criticism of Russia’s 
law aimed at the LGBT community gave the Western 
leaders reason not to participate in the games, though 
their athletes all competed.
!e Olympic afterglow quickly dimmed as West-
ern countries quickly imposed sanctions on some of 
Putin’s cronies in the aftermath of Russian aggression in 
Ukraine. Regardless of Putin’s motivation in occupying 
Crimea, there is a strong organizational link between 
Sochi and Crimea since many of the resources used to 
prepare the Olympics were repurposed to facilitate the 
incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation. 
Potentially, special forces units providing security at 
the Olympics participated in the take-over of Crimea. 
More obviously, Putin appointed Dmitry Kozak, who 
had been responsible for organizing the Olympics, as 
the new curator of Crimean a#airs in the Russian gov-
ernment. Additionally, much of the property associated 
with Olympstroy (o%ce equipment and automobiles), 
the state corporation set up to organize the games, is 
apparently being prepared for transfer to the Ministry 
for the Development of Crimea and regional authori-
ties in the occupied territory.1 In this sense, the Russian 
government seems to be treating Crimea like another 
mega-project, which it seeks to manage with top–down 
1 Maksim Tovkailo, “Vlasti Kryma poluchat imuchshestvo ‘Olimp-
stroya’”, Vedomosti.ru, 10 June 2014, <http://www.vedomosti.
ru/politics/news/27588831/krym-poluchit-nasledstvo-ot-sochi>
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control. While it is hard to predict whether the Kremlin 
will be able to successfully integrate the Ukrainian prov-
ince into Russia, it is clear that the task will be extremely 
expensive at a time when Russia’s resources are already 
tight due to slow economic growth.
Crimea presents another parallel with Sochi in that 
it is a second Black Sea locale, where the local economy 
is heavily dependent on tourism, and where the Krem-
lin is taking a strong special interest in its success. !e 
viability of the new infrastructure in Sochi will depend 
heavily on the arrival of tourists to use the facilities and 
amenities built at great public expense. But even as it is 
promoting Sochi, the Russian government is now o#er-
ing strong economic incentives for Russian tourists to 
travel to Crimea to boost the local economy of the occu-
pied territory. According to press reports, the number 
of tourists in Crimea is down considerably from previ-
ous years, predictably due to the unrest and uncertainty 
surrounding Ukraine and Ukrainian–Russian relations 
today. Anecdotal evidence suggests that even intrepid 
travelers from Russian cities who wanted to go to Crimea 
decided against vacationing there because the banks are 
not functioning and traveling on the peninsul required 
bringing large amounts of cash.
!e Domestic Audience
!e main audience for the Sochi Olympics was always 
Russia’s population. Existing evidence suggests that Rus-
sians were generally impressed by Putin’s handling of the 
games and that they increased his popularity. Accord-
ing to the Levada Center, 77 percent of Russians con-
sidered the games successful and that they evoked feel-
ings of pride and joy among the hosts.2 Two-thirds said 
that it made sense for Russia to host the games, though 
20 percent claimed that it did not. Eighty-one percent 
said that the games encouraged feelings of greater patri-
otism in the country, while 56 percent said the games 
were the personal achievement of Putin, and 73 percent 
said that they raised Putin’s authority. However, 57 per-
cent complained that the “billions spent on the Olym-
pics, should have been spent on the development of Rus-
sian cities: the construction of new housing to replace 
the old, and the modernization of healthcare.” Addi-
tionally 71 percent said that the country’s leadership 
used the games to boost the prestige of the authorities.
Overall, however, Putin won no more than a 3–4 
percent popularity bump from the Olympics. In fact, 
with that modest gain, the Levada Center’s Lev Gud-
kov thought that Putin’s long-term slide in the ratings 
2 <http://www.levada.ru/03-03-2014/itogi-olimpiiskikh-igr-v-so 
chi>
was inevitably going to continue.3 Ultimately, it was only 
the military confrontation with Ukraine that was able 
to return Putin to approval "gures above 80 percent.
Putin also apparently used the games to solidify sup-
port for his continued rule among Russia’s ruling elite. 
He awarded medals to the key players in supporting the 
Olympics in a secret ceremony that took place in the 
Kremlin at the end of March, according to a report in the 
newspaper Vedomosti, one of the few remaining newspa-
pers independent of Kremlin control.4 Among the recip-
ients of the prizes were Interros owner Vladimir Potanin, 
Sberbank President German Gref, Gazprom Manage-
ment Committee Chairman Alexei Miller, Russian Rail-
roads Chairman Vladimir Yakunin, Renova Chairman 
of the Board Viktor Vekselberg, and Chairman of the 
Board of Basic Elements Oleg Deripaska. !ese com-
panies were in charge of constructing key elements of 
the Olympic infrastructure, though most of the fund-
ing ultimately came from the state budget.
As many as 500 additional individuals who played a 
role in the Olympic construction are expected to receive 
awards in the future. Conspicuously missing from the 
"rst list, for example, was Arkady Rotenberg, whose 
companies were among the largest recipients of construc-
tion contracts according to investigations conducted by 
Alexey Navalny and his colleagues.
Neither the presidential administration, nor Vedo-
mosti explained why the ceremony was not held in public. 
However, the newspaper did remind readers that before 
the games took place, many observers had assumed that 
afterwards prosecutors would "le criminal cases because 
of the numerous cost overruns and missed deadlines. 
However, there has been no such process.
In fact, many of the key elites who bene"ted from 
the Olympics now seem to be lining up to pro"t from 
construction related to potentially building a bridge to 
link Russia to Crimea and the World Cup. However, 
not all of the contractors who worked on the Olympic 
sites are doing well in the games’ aftermath. In fact, two 
have entered bankruptcy—Mostovik and Tunnel Bri-
gade 44, whose chief has been arrested—and Inzhtrans-
stroy announced its liquidation. Reasons for the contrac-
tors’ problems included rapidly rising costs, poor project 
planning leading to unexpected expenses once construc-
tion began, and complicated government regulations 
that were often out-dated and inconsistent from region 
to region. In some cases, the customer delayed approval 
3 Mikhail Sokolov and Claire Bigg, “Putin Forever? Russian Presi-
dent’s Ratings Skyrocket Over Ukraine,” RFE/RL, June 3, 2014.
4 Maksim Tovkailo, Aleksandra Terenteva, Aleksei Nikolskiy, 
“Putin nagradil oligarkhov i rukovoditelei goskompaniy za Olim-
piadu,” Vedomosti.ru, 03 June 2014http://www.vedomosti.ru/
politics/news/27285521/olimpijskie-geroi#ixzz35Bslo1KA>
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of the plans until the last minute, forcing the contrac-
tors to complete all construction in an extreme hurry 
and therefore raised cost. According to Vedomosti, 98 
percent of money spent on the Sochi Olympics went to 
contractors, but they made little pro"t from it, though 
Rotenberg’s Mostotrest still managed to make a pro"t 
despite working in similar conditions.5 However, with 
the end of the Olympics, there are likely to be fewer 
major projects in Russia beyond the World Cup and 
potential construction e#orts associated with Crimea.
!e City of Sochi
Many questions remain about the impact of the Olym-
pic games on the city of Sochi itself. !e Olympic con-
struction brought numerous new sports facilities to the 
city as well as thousands of new hotel rooms. Long 
before the sport competitions began, critics wondered 
whether the $51 billion investment would produce via-
ble businesses that could thrive after the Olympic com-
petitors left town.
With the games now over, the future of the facili-
ties continues to remain murky. On April 16, Krasnodar 
Krai Governor Alexander Tkachev claimed that upkeep 
for the new sports facilities would cost the region 12 bil-
lion rubles a year (about $350 million).6 If the facilities 
are going to be able to earn back some of these expenses, 
they will need to be put into use quickly.
Before the Russian authorities began promoting 
tourism in Crimea, they had hoped to bring more visi-
tors to Sochi, particularly Russians who often prefer the 
cheaper vacation destinations in Turkey. !ere had been 
some discussion of allowing gambling in Sochi, to turn 
it into a Russian Las Vegas, but Putin nixed the idea, 
claiming it would prevent families from coming to the 
resort.7 After the G8 suspended Russia’s membership, 
Sochi had to scrap plans to host a major summit meet-
ing of the western leaders that had been planned for June. 
Now the main event on the calendar is a Formula One 
race in October. And the Fisht stadium, which hosted 
the opening and closing ceremonies, is being prepared 
to host some of the games for the 2018 World Cup. After 
2018, it will be the home stadium for a new soccer team 
that is being formed in Sochi.
But while such big events attract international head-
lines, Sochi will need a series of smaller festivals to bring 
in a steady stream of tourists throughout the year. More-
over, the city will have to survive in market conditions. 
Now, many of the sites built and previously owned by 
Olimpstroy and other companies are being unloaded to 
various state owners at the federal, regional, and munic-
ipal levels. If the state has to provide support for work-
ers who will be employed in loss-making enterprises, it 
will take away resources that could otherwise have been 
used for development investment. Simply dumping huge 
amounts of the money into the city did not necessarily 
provide the basis for balanced development. Building 
up one sector of the economy with extensive state sup-
port, such as tourism, will make it di%cult to develop 
other sectors of the Sochi economy because there will be 
higher expectations for wages and the costs of working 
there will be too expensive for other industries to thrive.
Using What Was Left Behind
While the Olympic movement is strongly anti-war, Rus-
sia’s preparations for the Sochi games helped Putin to 
stir up strong nationalist feelings that helped pave the 
way for his occupation of Crimea. Materially, some of 
the organizational and material resources that prepared 
Sochi are now part of the e#ort to incorporate Ukrainian 
territory into Russia. At the same time, Sochi’s facilities 
will be di%cult to transform into a viable business oper-
ation, particularly since the $ow of resources to Crimea 
will inevitably mean that there is less money available 
for Sochi and the other regions.
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